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Who Loaded What, When,
and Where: Capt. James
McKay and the SpanishAmerican War

Arrival of a battalion at Tampa in 1898. (Courtesy of the Henry B. Plant Museum Photographic
Collection.)
Joe Knetsch , Ph.D.
Paµ1el a K. Gibson

he usual story of the Tampa-based
preparations for the SpanishAmerican War is one of confusion,
incompetence and near chaos on
the waterfront. Testimony of many highranking and important officers and volunteers noted the general lack of organization
in the loading of the transport fleet prior to
the invasion of Cuba. Most of the regular officers also noted the lack of transports, the
fact that only one rail line went to the Port
of Tampa, and that the railroad cars were
mostly unlabeled and had to be opened individually to discover their contents. Sto-

ries of rotten beef, spoiled hardtack, and
railroad cars sitting for weeks on sidings
with perishable foodstuffs inside: all these
made spectacular headlines in many newspapers. The infamous "embalmed beef"
scandal played well in the "Yellow Journalism" of the day. Public outcry demanded
that all of these horrific events had to be investigated to provide an answer to the question: How can they be prevented from ever
happening again? The real question is, did
they ever happen at all? And, whether they
happened or were invented, who was to
blame?
In one of the more startling chapters in
the history of the "Splendid Little War,'' an
entire army was fitted out in Tampa, Flori45

da and prepared to invade Cuba. Tampa in
1898 was a growing town of just over 14,000
souls with few modern facilities. Its municipal streets were unpaved and mostly covered with Florida's ubiquitous sand. Few
buildings were up-to-date; most were rundown unpainted wooden structures. The
only spectacular building in the area was
Henry Bradley Plant's luxurious Tampa Bay
Hotel, opened in 1891 on the banks of the
Hillsborough River. The town did have two
railroads entering it but only one track
went to Port Tampa, nine miles south of the
Tampa town center. There, one major quay
awaited the military transports of the War;
that quay normally accommodated nine
ships with ease. In an emergency, Tampa
could have handled an army of about 5000,
but not one of nearly 30,000, which is approximately what finally showed up for the
affair.I
Tampa was one of three major points
chosen for the gathering of the army. New
Orleans and Mobile also played minor roles
in the impending war, but Tampa was designated by the joint Army-Navy Strategy
Board as the point of debarkation in the
original plan for the invasion of Cuba. This
plan called for an army of about 6000 men
to be shipped to the southern coast of Cuba
and to deliver arms, ammunition and other
supplies to General Maximo Gomez, the
leader of the Cuban forces in the Eastern
Provinces. The troops headed to Cuba under this plan were to be a reconnaissancein-force and not an actual invasion group.
On April 29, 1898, General of the Army
Nelson Miles chose Brigadier General
William Rufus Shafter to assemble this
force at Tampa. Shafter was advised to
avoid any direct action in Cuba and to "give
aid and succor to the insurgents, to render
the Spanish forces as much injury as possible, [while) avoiding serious injury to your
own command." The men Shafter commanded were all to be regular army, with no
volunteers contemplated. But war had been
declared on the 25th of April and the pressure on President William McKinley and
Congress was intense and argued for the
use of a large volunteer force. Admiral
George Dewey's surprising victory in Manila changed the battle plans, and what had
started out as a diversionary attack now
brought on the possibility of greater action
and acquisition.2 The Philippine victory
would have major consequences for Tampa.
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On April 30, President McKinley and
Secretary of War Russell Alger sent a note
to General Shafter canceling his reconnaissance-in-force and advising him to continue
troop preparations. In Washington, the
Army and Navy were debating which strategy was to prevail. The Navy insisted on the
blockade and bombardment of Havana and
other major positions. By coordinating the
Army, the Navy, and the Cuban insurgents,
Admiral William T. Sampson and others felt
that the Spanish Army in Cuba could be
starved into submission. The potential
hitch in this plan was the whereabouts and
power of the Spanish Navy, led by Admiral
Pascual de Cervera. As it turned out, the U.S.
Navy strategists over-estimated the power,
speed, and ability of the Spaniards. Many of
the Spanish fleet's ships were not as wellarmed as thought. Some were not even
completed vessels and were still under construction when the fleet left the Cape Verde
Islands for the theater of engagement. Overall, U.S. intelligence about the fleet was limited and the overseas network of agents
very amateurish. The Office of Naval Intelligence was relatively new, understaffed,
and saddled with more responsibilities than
it could handle at that stage of its development.3 Added to the intelligence deficit was
Admiral Sampson's lack of effective blockading vessels with enough fire-power to
effect his plans. Thus the President, Secretary Alger, General Miles, and others sent
new orders to Shafter.
In analyzing the force needed to take
Cuba, the Army debated the force's size and
the site of invasion over and over. Following
a report from Shafter that his advance command was ready to move, Alger and Miles
instructed him to be ready to move out on
May 9, 1898. Shafter's command was to be
augmented by the regular forces then at
Chickamauga and the Gulf ports. The additional 12,000 to 15,000 men, the strategists
reasoned, would be enough to take Mariel
and possibly Havana if they acted quickly
and decisively. During this same time
McKinley issued his famous call for volunteers, which would bring the invasion force
to about 70,000. Most of the volunteers
were National Guardsmen, with a strong
lobby in each state capital. The political
pressure to swear in and activate these
troops was tremendous, but so were the
problems. Many of these troops were already partially trained in Army fashion, but

View of the wharf at Port Tampa during the Spanish-American War. (Courtesy of the Tampa Bay
History Center Collection.)

most had obsolete weapons. Few had uniforms and most did not seriously train
every month. Consequently, the mobilization was slow. With the Spanish Navy still at
large in the Atlantic, potentially posing a
threat to the North American coastline, the
orders to sail were delayed.
A direct assault on a fortress as well-defended as Havana was reckoned to be costly. The timing of the battle plan would also
place any possible attack at the beginning
of the rainy season, complicating the operation even more. General Nelson Miles
strongly urged against such an assault,
based upon his experiences in the Civil War
and his vast knowledge of military strategy
and tactics. Instead, the General advised an
attack on the southern coast of Cuba,
preferably on the weakly defended eastern
end. An offensive launched from this location would be less costly in lives and present the best opportunity to use the Cuban
forces to help destroy Spain's hold on the island. The discovery of Admiral Cervera's
fleet in the area of Martinique on May 13 allowed the administration a "publicly acceptable excuse for postponing a campaign that
the Army was not yet ready to launch."4
Between May 9 and 14, Shafter was re-

inforced by about 6000 troops, bringing his
command to approximately 12,000 men. A
plan was launched to send the majority of
this force to Key West, until it was discovered that the drinking water in that island
city was running short with just the demands made upon it by the Navy and the
civilian population. Water would have to be
shipped into that port before any assault
could be launched from there. The Key
West plan was scratched and the new volunteer troops and other regulars from along
the eastern seaboard were sent to Tampa,
which by May 25 had over 17 ,000 men under arms awaiting the word to invade Cuba.
The number of troops in Tampa then outnumbered the city's civilian population.
The camp at Tampa Heights and the one at
the Port of Tampa were already overcrowded. The City of West Tampa opened its arms
to the incoming forces until it also had
more than it could handle. Troops were
transferred to new camps in Lakeland and
Jacksonville. s
The constantly changing plans, strategy
and orders put a heavy strain on Shafter
and his command. Additionally, the command also had to assist in preparing and
staffing three separate expeditions to Cuba
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to deliver guns, ammunition and medical
supplies to the Cuban insurgents. Two of
these excursions were led by Captain J.H.
Dorst of the Fourth Cavalry. The first of his
attempts to land supplies and troops met
with stiff opposition by the Spanish command at Point Abolitas, about forty miles
east of Havana. The commander of the
Spanish forces, Colonel Balboesis, was
killed in the action, but his men succeeded
in driving the United States troops off before they could accomplish their goal. The
second expedition was very successful in
delivering 7500 rifles, 1,300,000 rounds of
ammunition and 20,000 rations to the
Cuban forces at Port Banes on the northern
coast of Cuba. The last of the three expeditions, under the command of Lieutenant
C.P. Johnson, consisted of men of the Tenth
Cavalry, the famed Buffalo Soldiers, and
375 armed Cubans. This hugely successful
expedition included the troop- and supplycarrying ships Florida and Fanita, the latter owned by Captain James McKay of Tampa. Landing near Palo Alto, the party met
resistance from a Spanish force. The Army
took casualties (one dead and nine wounded) in the short but spirited engagement
that followed. These shipments and deliveries of arms, ammunitions and supplies were
an added burden to Shafter and his staff,
but they helped to keep up morale and interest in the impending Cuban invasion.6
The United States Army was organized
during this war into eight different Corps.
Each Corps was approximately 30,000 men
divided into three divisions. The divisions
were further divided into three brigades and
these divided into three regiments. The
Corps were composed only of infantry. Cavalry and artillery units were assigned to
assist each Corps, but were relatively independent in operation. The Fifth and
Seventh Corps called Tampa home at the
beginning of the conflict. The Fifth Corps
was composed mostly of regular troops augmented by some volunteer units as they arrived in camp. It was the Fifth Corps that
received the honor of spearheading the invasion of Cuba. 7
The biggest obstacle to the invasion of
Cuba was the lack of nearly everything.
Transports were the first priority for the
Army, but it had never before had to build,
rent or contract for such a large number of
vessels. The U.S. Army had only invaded
one other country (Mexico) in its history
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and that was in the 1840s. It had no experience with water-borne invasions. The only
sea-going transports available to the Army
were run-down old coastal vessels, the Navy
having taken most of the faster, lighter vessels for use as cruisers.8 Congress was not
helpful. That august body was chronically
resistant to any enlargement of the Army
during peace-time. Since the Civil War, the
Army had been consistently cut in size and
was under-funded in almost every department. It had only enough weapons on hand
to field a force of 25,000 men, yet in 1898 it
was fighting essentially a two-front war in
Cuba and the Philippines. The Quartermaster Corps was relatively small at the outbreak of the war and had not ordered
enough materials to handle an army of
more than 25,000, the approximate size of
the effective troops available for service.9 At
the beginning of the War, it should be remembered, the plans did not call for a fullscale invasion, and the Quartermaster's and
Commissary's staffs were gearing up for only a small reconnaissance-in-force type of
operation. No U.S. military leader had ever
led a force larger than a regiment. Most of
the activity between the Civil War and the
Spanish-American War had been against
the western tribes of Native Americans, and
these campaigns rarely required more than
a regiment. Most of the companies in the
regular regiments had not worked together
at all. Regimental-scale war games or maneuvers were unheard of until later. All told,
the Army was simply not prepared to undergo an operation like the invasion of Cuba. Everything had to be learned from experience and that was going to be a hard
teacher.10
The general lack of military readiness
was exemplified by America's coastal defense. Military historian Walter Millis, in his
classic Arms and Men: A Study of American Military History , made the following
observation: "In 1897 the truest symbol of
American military policy was still the
heavy, immovable and purely defensive seacoast gun." When the war seemed unavoidable, McKinley asked Congress for additional funding and received in return the "Fifty
Million Dollar Bill" to fund the war. The
Army, reflecting outmoded thinking and responding to the fears of Congressmen from
the coastal states, spent the majority of its
allotment on coastal defense. Very little
funding went to the Quartermaster's Corps,

the Medical Corps or the Signal Corps.11
When the Endicott Board met in 1885, it
had recommended 2362 gun emplacements
and batteries be installed to defend the
American coastline. At the outbreak of the
Cuba war only 151 had been installed. Congressional under-funding haunted even this
well-thought out plan.12 The coastal defense system may have been the "truest
symbol" of United States policy, but it did
little to solve the problem of assembling the
largest invasion force seen to date by the
American public.13
At Shafter's headquarters in Tampa, the
biggest problem was getting the transports
and loading them efficiently so they could
be unloaded in the briefest time possible.
An amphibious landing of the size contemplated for Cuba had never before been attempted by the Army, and Shafter had no
experienced help on his staff to solve the
loading problems. At that juncture, the
Quartermaster, Colonel Charles F. Humphrey, discovered the talent needed was
close at hand in the person of Captain
James M. McKay, Jr. McKay had already
been involved in the Cuban revolution and
had run both guns and volunteer fighters to
the island on the Fanita, his fast new
ship.14 The Captain had long familiarity
with the Cuban maritime trade. He earned
his title of "Captain" by sailing with his father in their beef business in Havana, and
as the owner of the family shipping line at
his father's death. In 1886, he threw in his
lot with the Plant Steamship Company and
captained the Plant System steam packets
Mascotte and, later, Olivette. Both those
ships and his own Fanita were to play important roles in the invasion and subsequent events. (McKay's long and distinguished career would later include two
terms as a Florida Senator, United States
Marshal for the southern district of Florida,
two years as Mayor of Tampa, and Postmaster of Tampa in 1914.) McKay's knowledge
of the waters around Tampa Bay and along
the Cuban coasts made him a valuable person to the invasion, however it was his intimate knowledge of the loading and unloading of ships that made him indispensable.IS
Colonel Humphrey was very pleased to
have someone of McKay's experience on
hand to assist in the complicated operation.
In testimony before the Committee Investigating the Conduct of the War (often called
the "Dodge Committee" after its chairman,
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Loading an artillery piece onto a transport at
Port Tampa. (Courtesy of the Tampa Bay
History Center Collection.)

General Grenville M. Dodge), Humphrey
stated: "He [McKay] was my principal assistant. He came to me by order of the Secretary of War and was a most valuable man.
He had been a steamship captain, and a
United States marshal more recently." The
Colonel went on to describe his "principal
assistant,'' in the following terms: "He was
an exceedingly level-headed man. At Port
Tampa, and subsequently in Cuba, his
range of duties with ocean transportation
were exceedingly great. He did everything
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Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, left,
speaks to Captain Lee of the British Army near
one of the campsites in and around Tampa during the build-up to the Spanish-American War.
(Courtesy of the Tampa Bay History Center
Collection.)

so

an exceptionally good man could do in that
very responsible position." Colonel Humphrey also noted it was McKay's natural disposition to try and accommodate people,
and he tried to procure for any officer whatever they requested. Most of the time,
Humphrey noted, McKay was miles away
from the war command and did much of the
supervising of the unloading by himself.16
This was a tremendous responsibility for a
civilian working under a military commander in time of war.
Captain McKay's biggest problem was
the loading of the materials at Port Tampa.
To load the materials of war onto thirtyeight transport ships not designed for
wartime use meant that each one be fitted
out for its new role. Cargo ships had to be
made comfortable for the transport of
troops and horses. Accommodations had to
be fitted for the officers and medical staff.
Supplies had to be placed in such an order
so as to be convenient for debarkation in
Cuba. All of this was made more difficult by

the fact that many of the railroad cars filled
with provisions, ammunition, weapons, forage, etc., were unlabeled and the bills-oflading had not arrived in Tampa to allow
them to be sorted out before loading onto
the ships. Colonel Humphrey described the
resulting problems: "The loading of the
transports was at best difficult, owing to the
limited wharf facilities and not having on
hand full cargoes; it being necessary to
bring transports into the canal to be loaded,
and often before loading could be completed sent them into the harbor, to be brought
back in a future time to complete cargo."17
Somehow, space had to be found for 16,154
men and 834 officers, along with the large
amount of military stores needed to conduct the campaign.18 It was miraculous that
the entire operation was completed between 2:30 a.m. on June 7, 1898 and 9:00
p.m. on the following day. Given the severe
problems with unmarked railroad cars, impatient officers and men, a severe lack of
lighters to haul materials to ships at anchor
and a lack of trained stevedores on the
docks, this was truly a miracle.19 That this
was done with a relatively minimal number
of breakdowns in the process is a tribute to
Humphrey and McKay.
During the operation, Captain McKay
was involved in a number of high-level decisions that profoundly affected the expedition. The original estimate for the number
of troops that could be transferred to Cuba
in the available ships was given as over
30,000 men and material. McKay, with his
expert knowledge of transports, advised
Shafter that this number was too high and
revised it to accommodate 24,000 men
more comfortably. When the loading was in
its final stages, McKay, along with General
Henry W. Lawton, was assigned the task of
adjusting the arrangements by moving
troops from one ship to another, in order to
give them as much room and freedom of
movement as possible. McKay also oversaw
the loading of the materials so that the ammunition and rations would be off-loaded
first, followed by the forage and medical
supplies.20 For a civilian to undertake such
responsibilities demonstrated McKay's abilities and acumen, as well as the faith others
had in him. When General Shafter appeared
in front of the Dodge Commission, he
specifically noted the service of Captain
McKay and declared: "I regard him as a
most efficient man; I am not a seafaring

Supplies stacked next to the gangways, awaiting loading onto transports at Port Tampa. (Courtesy
of the Tampa Bay History Center Collection.)

man, but when a man goes about everything
and makes no back steps, you don't have to
have an expert opinion on him." Every essential person involved in the loading operation knew that Captain McKay was in
charge. He was obeyed as if he were a ranking officer in the regular service.21
This positive picture of the process of
loading the troops and materials differs substantially from that offered by two of the
more famous critics of the affair, Colonel
Leonard Wood and Lieutenant Colonel
Theodore Roosevelt. The "standard" version of the story comes almost directly from
Roosevelt's classic, The Rough Riders. In
this highly colorful - and colored - account, the loading is filled with drama and
foreboding, but ends with the happy seizure
of the Yucatan by the Rough Riders and the
fending off of the troops from the SeventyFirst New York Volunteers. Of course, the
Second United States Regular Infantry are
graciously allowed to board their vessel in
time for departure. The story also suggests
that the procedure was total chaos with no
one in charge. Colonel Humphrey, in the
account, "might just as well have been
asleep, as nobody knew where he was and
nobody could find him, and the quay was
crammed with some ten thousand men,

most of whom were working at cross purposes." Only after a frantic search did Wood
and Roosevelt find, by separate routes,
Colonel Humphrey, and get the assurance
that the Yucatan was their assigned transport. 22 It was after this initial drama that
the Rough Riders got to their ship and prepared for their final destiny and future
fame.
Few have ever questioned this account
by the future President, and nearly every
biographer of "T.R." has repeated the story
intact, but why not question Roosevelt's
version of the event? Historians have long
known that the future President was an
"unreliable witness" when it came to many
aspects of the war in Cuba. From his assertions that he suffered with his troops in the
sandy camp at Port Tampa while officers
enjoyed the luxury of the Tampa Bay Hotel
(where, in fact, Roosevelt stayed for three
days with his wife Edith), to his claim that
his unit attained the summit of Kettle Hill
first (it was as likely that soldiers of the
Ninth Cavalry did), Roosevelt's credibility is
far from airtight.
One of the key features in Roosevelt's
portrait of confusion and chaos at the embarkation point in Tampa was the fact that
there were, in the space of forty-eight
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hours, nearly 17 ,000 men and prov1s10ns
loaded onto the transport fleet and only one
rail line feeding the quay. The image was of
a mass of disorganized men and horses trying to get onto their various ships. Stacking
the vessels three wide in the canal also presented a picture of relative disorganization.
However, given the enormity of the task and
the efficiency with which it was performed,
it is hardly likely that chaos reigned. Roosevelt, it must be remembered, was a Lieutenant Colonel of a regiment; orders may
not have reached down that far in the chain
of command. Both Humphrey and McKay
testified that Shafter had approved a list of
units to be placed upon each ship and that
almost all reached their assigned destination in fairly good order. Most telling, as far
as the accuracy of Roosevelt's account is
concerned, is the fact that although reports
indicate that everyone knew that McKay
was in charge of the loading, "T.R." seemed
unaware of that fact. He wrote the Dodge
Commission that: "I never saw Captain
McKay, and, indeed, never heard of him until I heard of his testimony [to the Commission.)"23 As famous, energetic and politically astute, as he was, Roosevelt could not
have had knowledge of everything, especially since he was relatively far down on the
chain of command.
James McKay's own testimony before
the Dodge Commission sheds a great deal of
light on the activities of this "level-headed"
man and, as well, on the activities so criticized by Roosevelt. During the greatest part
of the brief war McKay was on active duty
as Colonel Humphrey's assistant. He served
from May 4 until August 30, 1898 with only
ten days away from active duty. The ship
captain testified that he was in charge of
loading the stores of the commissary, quartermaster and artillery along with mules
and wagons. McKay noted that each ship
carried no fewer than 100,000 rations
aboard and that many had more. This was
enough to feed the troops while in transport
and for the first few days after landing. The
captain also stated that he only found five
ships overcrowded in the initial loading and
that these were soon relieved, with the surplus troops being sent to less crowded vessels. The Plant System steamer Olivette
served as a hospital ship for the first part of
the invasion. McKay oversaw the loading of
124 wagons for the immediate forces and an
additional 60 to 80 for those of General J . C.
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Bates. There were enough horses and mules
loaded onto the transports to power these
wagons. The biggest producer of later criticism was the lack of ambulances, which
Shafter had personally ordered left behind,
rationalizing that the rough roads of Cuba
would not cause anyone wounded to notice
the difference between an ambulance and a
wagon. The greatest problem for loading all
the stores was the lack of space on the railroad line leading to the port. The congestion and confusion of not having properly
labeled cars also greatly hampered the loading of the stores.24
Captain McKay's testimony about the
Rough Riders and the seizing of the Yucatan is most interesting. When questioned
by General Dodge about the orders allegedly received by these troops, the captain did
not hesitate to declare that it was part of
their orders to report to that ship. When
asked about Colonel Wood's knowledge of
the orders he stated: "He must have known
it. He marched right aboard." When asked
point blank about the Rough Riders seizing
the Yucatan, McKay replied: "They didn't
do anything of the kind." All of the boarding
went pretty much as scheduled with little
confusion, according to the captain. McKay
presented a paper with notations of the
troops to board the Yucatan. General James
A. Beaver of the Pennsylvania Volunteers
read this paper aloud: "Yucatan designated
No. 8, headquarters band and companies C,
D, G, and B, Second United States Infantry,
First Regiment U. S. Volunteer Cavalry."
General Beaver asked McKay if all that was
designated before anyone went on board.
"Yes sir; that was designated," replied
McKay.25 It was this testimony of Captain
McKay, countering Roosevelt's story of the
event, that prompted "T.R." to write the
Commission.
General William R. Shafter had a good
laugh over Roosevelt's seizure story. Upon
hearing of the Roosevelt riposte to McKay's
statements the gruff old veteran wrote to
the Dodge Commission himself. In his letter
of December 21, 1898, the General quoted
a letter he had received from Major Leon S.
Roudiez of the Quartermaster's Corps. Major Roudiez wrote: "I have a distinct recollection of meeting the wild and woolly
'Rough Rider' [Roosevelt) at the foot of the
gang plank as he was about to embark on a
transport. His men had halted and were in a
double column behind him. I did not know

him at the time and, not noticing his rank, I
asked for the officer in command ... He stated that he was in command of the regiment
temporarily during Colonel Wood's absence." Roudiez's letter continued: "I then
informed him that he was assigned to the
transport before us and that he could march
on board at any time. As we were talking
Colonel Wood appeared upon the upper
deck of the ship and hailed us. I repeated to
Colonel Wood what I had said to Colonel
Roosevelt, and went on. The 'Rough Rider'
then galloped on board." Roudiez's final
comment speaks directly to the discrepancy
between Roosevelt's and McKay's version of
the boarding. "There are a great many funny things testified to by various parties," he
wrote, "who appear before the commission,
and I really don't know whether it is worth
while to worry about their statements or
even pay the slightest attention to them."26
Given Shafter's views on headline grabbing,
the General undoubtedly enjoyed forwarding Roudiez's letter to the Commission.
Some stories, scandals, and conflicted
accounts of the War are not as well researched as others. The widely publicized
embalmed beef scandal, for example, was
tackled by two different government commissions and found to be untrue. That the
meat was the victim of being left on a sidetrack for days on end in the heat of a Florida June is not disputed. The heat did break
down some of the chemical components of
the beef packing and made some changes to
the taste, but the product was not the cause
of the illnesses reported. Indeed, more wartime diseases were attributed to the heat,
mosquitoes, and dehydration of the troops
than to any foodstuffs sent for their meals.
General Nelson Miles' charges of bad beef
and inedible bread made his testimony
sensational, but it did not make it true, as
the two investigating commissions discovered.27 Unsanitary conditions in many
camps also added greatly to the suffering of
the troops. As in the case of the overcrowding on the ships and the confusion on the
docks, much of the controversy was stirred
up by those reporting - accurately or inaccurately - on the War, or by those wishing to politically damage the McKinley
administration.
The service rendered by Captain James
McKay, Jr. in the course of the SpanishAmerican War was difficult and dangerous.
He oversaw the loading and unloading of the

supplies of the Fifth Corps in Tampa and at
Daiquiri, and even accompanied some of
these supplies to the front. The Captain assisted the Quartermaster for the Fifth Corps
and earned that gentleman's unwavering
trust. McKay also earned the respect of the
commanding general and most of the members of his staff. To load nearly 17 ,000 officers and men onto 38 transports from a
quay serviced by only one railroad line and
do it in less than forty-eight hours is a
remarkable feat. General Shafter had promised President McKinley that this would be
done and Humphrey and McKay made it
happen. At the other end of the line, McKay
had to oversee the unloading of the stores at
Daiquiri while Humphrey was doing similar
duty at Siboney. Left alone with such responsibility, Captain McKay made sure of
the safety of his vessels first and waited until the pier was refurbished by the Army
Corps of Engineers and it was safe to unload. Most of the stores he then unloaded
were medical supplies in heavy demand at
the front. Testimony by General John Weston shows that McKay did his job well,
promptly, and with utmost safety.28 That
nearly everyone in command positions believed Captain James McKay, Jr. did his job
efficiently is ample indication of the value of
his services. More specific and public commemoration of this gallant service is long
over-due. Captain McKay deserves to be recognized for his service in the war that
opened the "American Century."
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